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Security Council

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English
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Letter dated 1 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

In the aftermath of the unrestrained violence which occurred in Juba from 8 to 25 July 2016, and the vicious assaults on both civilians and United Nations staff, I ordered an Independent Special Investigation led by Major General Patrick Cammaert (retired). The Independent Special Investigation was mandated to review the actions of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in response to both the sexual violence and violence against civilians that occurred in Juba during that period, and the Terrain camp incident.

Please find attached a summary of the Independent Special Investigation highlighting the key findings of the report together with a list of recommendations to the parties concerned (see annex). The recommendations point out issues specific to UNMISS as well as systemic problems which should be addressed in order to implement the civilian protection mandate more efficiently.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

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Annex

Executive summary of the independent special investigation into the violence in Juba in 2016 and the response by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

Background

1. The crisis that took place in Juba from 8 to 11 July 2016 saw three days of intense fighting that resulted in the death of many civilians and two peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the collapse of the fragile peace agreement between the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and his former First-Vice President, Riek Machar. The crisis brought unrestrained violence to the capital of the world's youngest nation and the participating fighters left a trail of destruction and suffering in their wake.

2. On 23 August 2016, the Secretary-General established an independent special investigation led by Major General (retired) Patrick Cammaert, mandated to examine two aspects of the crisis in Jubain July 2016: violence against civilians, including sexual violence, within or in the vicinity of the UNMISS headquarters, known as "UN House", and its two adjacent protection of civilian sites, which house more than 27,000 internally displaced persons; and the attack on Terrain camp, a private compound where United Nations personnel, aid workers and local staff were robbed, beaten, raped and killed by armed soldiers. This included determining whether the Mission and its contingents responded appropriately; assessing the United Nations security plans and procedures and the Mission's role in them; and, with regard to the attack on Terrain camp, determining the perpetrators. Under both areas of focus, the Secretary-General mandated the special investigation to put forward recommendations, including remedial actions, with regard to, inter alia, the underperformance of UNMISS personnel, if necessary.

Methodology

3. The special investigation team undertook desk reviews and held meetings in New York, including with humanitarian protection partners. The team travelled to Entebbe, Uganda, and Juba from 9 to 29 September 2016, where 67 interviews were held with numerous witnesses, victims, ministers and officials from the Government of South Sudan, staff from all components of UNMISS, the United Nations country team and humanitarian non-governmental organizations. In Juba, the special investigation team visited the UNMISS headquarters at UN House and its Tomping base, the Juba protection of civilian sites, the Terrain camp, the looted World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse and other locations.

Findings

Before the crisis

4. The return of former First-Vice President Riek Machar to Juba with more than 1,200 armed fighters was pursued as an essential starting point for the implementation of the peace agreement. Despite the security risks, and over the strong objections of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, international security advisers and generals in the Government army, these

Opposition soldiers were placed less than a kilometre from UN House and the protection of civilian sites, putting internally displaced persons and United Nations personnel in the crossfire should fighting break out. International mediators working with the Government and the Opposition at the time agreed that this was a necessary compromise in order to secure the peace agreement.

5. In the weeks prior to the violence, UNMISS and the humanitarian community saw timely and accurate warning signs of the resumption of hostilities in Juba between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Notwithstanding the early warning that fighting would take place near UN House, the Mission did not properly prepare for three critical and foreseeable scenarios: (a) First, that fighting along the northern perimeter of UN House would prompt internally displaced persons in protection of civilian site 1 to enter the UN House compound to seek greater protection; second, that the Mission would face significant movement restrictions from the Government, envisaged in many scenarios but never clearly planned for in integrated military and security contingency plans; and third, that UN House would likely be caught in crossfire; watchtowers and defensive positions along the perimeter were poorly prepared and equipped to stop even small arms fire, severely limiting the ability of the Mission to respond when fighting with heavy weapons started.

During the crisis

6. Caught on the frontlines of active conflict, the Mission faced an extremely challenging set of circumstances during the crisis. Artillery, tanks and helicopter gunships were all used, sometimes within metres of UN House. In three days of fighting, two Chinese peacekeepers were killed and several injured, 182 buildings on the UN House compound were struck by bullets, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades and thousands of internally displaced persons fled into UN House from the protection of civilian sites seeking protection.

7. The special investigation found that a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel had culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence.

8. On the civilian side, despite strong efforts from the UNMISS Joint Operations Centre, Mission-wide and integrated coordination was poor before and during the crisis. The Mission's established culture of reporting and acting in silos inhibited effective action during a period in which swift, joint action was essential. The Joint Operations Centre and the Security Information Operations Centre were not co-located, as required by United Nations policy, contributing to a fragmented security response.

9. On the uniformed side, the Force did not operate under a unified command, resulting in multiple and sometimes conflicting orders to the four troop contingents from China, Ethiopia, India and Nepal and ultimately underusing the more than 1,800 infantry troops at UN House. The Force Commander appointed the Chinese Battalion Commander as the Incident Commander, commanding all the forces at UN House in addition to his own battalion. Furthermore, the Force Commander ordered the Incident Commander to retain an explicit and ultimately confusing command link to Sector South headquarters in Tomping, which was physically cut

off from UN House for the duration of the fighting. This confused arrangement, in combination with the lack of leadership on the ground, contributed to incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents at UN House. This included at least two instances in which the Chinese battalion abandoned some of its defensive positions at protection of civilian site 1 on 10 and 11 July. The performance of the Nepalese formed police unit in stopping looting by some internally displaced persons inside UN House and controlling the crowd was inadequate.

Roles of the Government and the Opposition

10. The special investigation emphasizes that the responsibility for the protection of South Sudanese civilians rests first and foremost with the Government of South Sudan. During the crisis, Government and Opposition forces fired indiscriminately, striking United Nations facilities and protection of civilian sites, and attacked civilians, resulting in the deaths of more than 20 internally displaced persons in the protection of civilian sites and injuries to dozens more. Government soldiers also perpetrated the attack on Terrain camp, a charge that the Government did not dispute in a meeting with the Special Investigation team on 15 September. Government forces have been implicated in the sexual violence against civilians around the protection of civilian sites in the aftermath of the fighting.

Terrain camp incident

11. The Mission failed to respond to the situation at Terrain camp, located 1.2 kilometres from UN House. When Government soldiers forcibly entered the camp on 11 July, there were approximately 70 civilians in the camp. This included Terrain camp staff and residents, of whom five were United Nations personnel whom the Mission had a clear mandate to protect, as well as more than a dozen humanitarian aid workers who fell within the security framework of the United Nations and the Mission's broader mandate to protect civilians. At approximately 1530 hours, when the soldiers began looting and forcing their way into the accommodations, the residents immediately notified United Nations security and UNMISS. During the attack, civilians were subjected to and witnessed gross human rights violations, including murder, intimidation, sexual violence and acts amounting to torture perpetrated by armed Government soldiers.

12. The Joint Operations Centre made multiple requests to stand up a quick-reaction force to respond but each UNMISS contingent turned down the request, indicating that its troops were fully committed. The situation at UN House remained chaotic at this time, with thousands of internally displaced persons in the staff accommodation area, armed men still threatening the perimeter of protection of civilian site 3 and large numbers of armed Government soldiers still on Yei road in front of the main gate of UN House. Even after the Government's highest-ranking general provided a liaison officer to meet an UNMISS quick-reaction force at a checkpoint near the main gate to facilitate its movement to Terrain camp, no response team materialized.

13. By approximately 1900 hours, members of the South Sudan National Security Service had extracted the majority of residents at the Terrain camp. Three international female humanitarian workers were left behind. The Mission learned

that they were unaccounted for by 2040 hours but made no attempt to send a force to extract the three women on the evening of 11 July. Between 2100 and 2200 hours, one of the three women managed to call United Nations security. The security officer, whom the special investigation was unable to identify, was dismissive of her appeal for assistance and did not call her back when her phone credit expired. United Nations security did not log this call. While the UNMISS Joint Operations Centre worked through the night to prepare plans to launch a quick-reaction force at first light, no team was deployed. The three women remained overnight at the Terrain camp, as well as about 20 Terrain camp staff in several locations around the camp. A private security company, dispatched by a non-governmental organization, extracted the three remaining female humanitarian workers at approximately 0700 hours on 12 July.

Sexual violence

14. The weeks after the fighting also saw an increase in sexual violence against civilians in and around the protection of civilian sites in Juba. The special investigation reviewed several reports from the media and non-governmental organizations of sexual violence, particularly around the protection of civilian sites, alleging that peacekeepers failed to respond to incidents of sexual violence occurring directly in front of them on 17 and 18 July. While these incidents of sexual violence most certainly occurred, the special investigation was unable to verify the allegations regarding the response by the peacekeepers. The special investigation received other information, however, that suggests poor performance by peacekeepers in protecting civilians from sexual violence in the vicinity of the protection of civilian sites. On at least one occasion on 2 September, attackers assaulted a woman just metres away from the entrance to protection of civilian site 1, in plain sight of UNMISS troops and United Nations police. Despite the woman's screams, they did not react. UNMISS staff officers in the area intervened and prevented a further assault.

15. After the crisis, the Force and police components continued to display a risk-averse posture unsuited to protecting civilians from sexual violence and other opportunistic attacks. More than two months after the crisis, the Mission still does not conduct regular dismounted (on foot) patrols, standing patrols or patrols outside its perimeter at night. When the Mission does conduct patrols, its soldiers peer out from the tiny windows of armoured personnel carriers, an approach ill-suited to detecting perpetrators of sexual violence and engaging with communities to provide a sense of security.

Looting

16. The end of the fighting brought widespread looting to areas around UN House. WFP had requested UNMISS force protection for its compound and main warehouse prior to the crisis. The Mission did not provide this protection and $29 million worth of food, equipment and supplies was looted over more than three weeks. Similarly, the warehouse of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations that contained seeds and agricultural equipment was looted.

Challenges relating to the protection of civilians

17. The Mission continues to face challenges in providing security in and around the protection of civilian sites. As highlighted by the United Nations board of inquiry for Malakal, protecting the protection of civilian sites — effectively small cities of thousands of people — is beyond the capability of UNMISS or any peacekeeping mission and a task that raises unreasonable expectations. The Mission recognizes, however, that the protection of civilian sites will likely remain for some years and that UNMISS has a key role in providing security and maintaining their civilian character. The protection of civilian sites at UN House have been surrounded by thick bush in some places, making the observation of criminal activities from perimeter watchtowers difficult, if not impossible. Porous perimeters with numerous holes allow internally displaced persons to easily smuggle weapons in and out of the sites.

18. The special investigation found that the lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control and a risk-averse or "inward-looking" posture resulted in a loss of trust and confidence, particularly by the local population and humanitarian agencies, in the will and skill of UNMISS military and police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence and human rights violations.

Recommendations

19. On the basis of the findings and conclusions of the special investigation, the following actions are recommended:

To the United Nations Secretariat

(a) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General should address the failure by peacekeepers to protect civilians. Recognizing that failure by peacekeepers to act when civilians are attacked rises above the level of simple underperformance, the Secretariat should draw on the thorough and systematic follow-up procedures established to address allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Inaction by peacekeepers when civilians are attacked within one kilometre of a peacekeeping base should be promptly investigated and peacekeepers, commanders and relevant troop-contributing countries should be held accountable for failures to protect. Discussions with troop- and police-contributing countries will be critical to establishing clear expectations on all sides;

(b) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support should promptly develop an action plan with short timelines that outlines the key actions required to restore the credibility of both the United Nations and UNMISS and regain the trust and confidence of national and international partners in the Mission's will and ability to fully implement its mandate to protect civilians and United Nations staff. The status of the implementation of the recommendations of the special investigation should be assessed within three months of the presentation of the report to the Secretary-General and appropriate follow-up measures should be taken to ensure swift implementation;

(c) The Department of Safety and Security, relevant humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations should ensure clear and country-specific expectations and obligations;

(d) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including its Office of Military Affairs, should take the following steps:

(i) Provide clear guidance and direction to new incoming Force Commanders on the vision and expectations of United Nations Headquarters with respect to the implementation of the mandate, the rules of engagement and the use of force. It should also consider reintroducing a written Force Commander directive with instructions and guidance on key elements of the work of a Force Commander's at the start of a Force Commander's tenure;

(ii) Ensure that all UNMISS battalion commanders, key battalion staff officers and military staff officers have a working command of English;

(iii) Establish and deploy a mobile training support team of experienced peacekeepers and officers from troop-contributing countries, including the UNMISS troop contributors, to train battalion officers on the UNMISS mandate, the rules of engagement, the use of force and challenges in peacekeeping; these teams should use a scenario training concept, including training on sexual violence, based on Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support guidance and training on the protection of civilians;

(e) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support should increase support for existing effective training programmes for contingent commanders and female military and police officers;

(f) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support should revisit the current mentoring programmes for Force Commanders and Deputy Force Commanders to provide scenario training on protection of civilians, including from conflict-related sexual violence, and make it more mission-oriented and less Headquarters-focused;

(g) The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support and Safety and Security should ensure that missions have rigorous contingency plans in place that are regularly rehearsed through table-top exercises and rehearsals. All missions should regularly conduct table-top exercises and rehearsals. These plans should be revisited following any significant change in the environment and/or in the mandate;

(h) Provide clarity on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2304 (2016), particularly on violations of the status-of-forces agreement, restrictions on freedom of movement and use of force ("robust action") for UNMISS forces and the planned Regional Protection Force. Concerns about two types of forces in UNMISS with a deployment of a Regional Protection Force should be addressed through clear orders and statements on "One Mission, One Force", with UNMISS troops and the Regional Protection Force having the same authorization to use force under the same rules of engagement and freedom of movement directives;

To the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

(i) Together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the troop-contributing countries concerned, address and implement as soon as possible relevant recommendations of the special investigation into the 16 to18 February 2016 attack on the UNMISS protection of civilian site in Malakal (31 May 2016) and the United Nations board of inquiry on the circumstances of the clashes that occurred at the protection of civilian site in Malakal (25 June 2016);

(j) Immediately change how UNMISS troops implement their mandate to protect civilians from physical violence, including sexual violence, by enforcing a forward-leaning, highly mobile posture; conducting robust, dismounted day and night patrolling; dominating areas around the protection of civilian sites; and providing adequate protection aimed at preventing and ending human rights violations and abuses of civilians;

(k) Regularly conduct scenario-based training and rehearsals on mandate implementation, the use of rules of engagement and directives on the use of force; on integrated contingency plans, including evacuation and extraction, with key actors to facilitate preparedness for worst-case and most dangerous scenarios; and on the division of responsibilities among the Force, United Nations police and United Nations security on the security of the protection of civilian sites, including but not limited to handover procedures from formed police units to the Force;

(l) Revise operational and tactical arrangements in Juba to better facilitate crisis management;

(m) The Force Commander should ensure that integrated dismounted patrols are conducted when possible to include (female) military, police and civilian sections such as human rights and women's protection advisers in areas around the protection of civilian sites, UN House and other locations as appropriate;

(n) Mission support should work with United Nations security to ensure preparedness for potential crises, including:

(i) Building shelters to protect from direct and indirect fire in close proximity to working spaces or sleeping accommodation in UN House;

(ii) Improving trauma care and medical evacuation capabilities in UN House to send a strong message of support to UNMISS personnel and, if needed, temporarily fill gaps in such care and capabilities by hiring from the civilian market;

(o) Mission support should work with the Force, United Nations police and United Nations security to ensure sufficient security infrastructure for the protection of civilian sites;

(p) The Mission Chief of Staff should revisit crisis response coordination arrangements and establish an integrated operations centre incorporating all actors in UN House (military, United Nations police, United Nations security and formed police units) that are co-located with but separate from the Joint Operations Centre, which has no tasking authority;

(q) The principal security adviser should ensure that United Nations agency, funds and programme security needs are appropriately prioritized in security planning. He should also ensure that United Nations security personnel are aware of their responsibilities to non-UNMISS personnel under the United Nations security management system and the Saving Lives Together framework and that failures to take the security concerns of United Nations agencies and humanitarian non-governmental organizations seriously will result in reprimand and, where necessary, dismissal;

To the Government of South Sudan

(r) Ensure that the Government investigation into the attack on Terrain camp is transparent, swift and credible, with a process that holds perpetrators to account. Make clear and public statements from the highest levels of military and political authority that violence and attacks on humanitarian actors, aid workers and civilians will not be tolerated, are illegal and will be prosecuted and punished;

To the Security Council

(s) Utilize the full spectrum of Security Council members' authority to address restrictions on freedom of movement, violations of the status-of-forces agreement and obstructions in the medical evacuation of United Nations personnel. These restrictions endanger lives and paralyse the mission. Security Council members should put increased political and economic pressure on countries that obstruct the implementation of Council mandates, including South Sudan;

(t) Recognize that the role of the Mission in providing security and protection cannot be separated from its political role. The UNMISS Special Representative of the Secretary-General should have the full and united support of the Security Council in playing a more proactive role in engaging with the parties;

To troop- and police-contributing countries

(u) Confirm to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in writing (compact) that troops are willing and able to conduct dismounted patrols, including standing patrols by day and night outside the perimeter of United Nations compounds and protection of civilian sites in surrounding areas as ordered by the Force Commander; use the rules of engagement to the fullest extent; improve interaction with the local population; and implement the mandate to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and United Nations staff. Troop- and police-contributing countries should also ensure that commanders on the ground are trained and instructed accordingly and held accountable for underperformance by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;

(v) All junior and senior commanders should conduct scenario training on the mandate and rules of engagement, and formed police unit commanders should be trained on the directives on the use of force during their predeployment training. Troop-contributing and police-contributing countries should be required to provide the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support with their predeployment training programmes, including the curriculum for these training activities;

(w) Police-contributing countries should send more female police officers to UNMISS to carry out community-policing activities and to reach out to victims and survivors of sexual violence.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 69 (a) and 108

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 1 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to the following:

Armed terrorist groups active in the city of Aleppo fired a large number of rockets and mortar shells at neighbourhoods in western Aleppo. Their targets included the United Nations headquarters located in the Shahba Hotel, which was hit on the western side that faces Bustan al-Qasr, a neighbourhood controlled by terrorist groups. That reprehensible terrorist attack led the acting United Nations Resident Coordinator in the Syrian Arab Republic to evacuate that office's staff from Aleppo.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic condemns that terrorist attack, which was carried out by the Nur al-Din al-Zanki terrorist organization and other terrorist entities affiliated with the Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida terrorist organizations. It calls on the United Nations and the Security Council to condemn that attack and to compel the Governments of States that support terrorist groups to cease their violations of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, put an end to the crimes of their affiliated terrorist groups, and fully implement the relevant United Nations and Security Council counter-terrorism resolutions, in particular resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2016), as well as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism

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Strategy and the resolution adopted at the conclusion of the fifth Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its commitment to the security and safety of international and local humanitarian workers. It believes that the decision to evacuate United Nations staff from Aleppo at this critical juncture was inappropriate and constitutes an abdication by the Secretariat of its responsibilities and obligations under the Charter. The Syrian Government deplores the failure of senior United Nations officials to condemn crimes and attacks by armed terrorist groups, even those committed against the Organization's own headquarters, especially when the Secretariat seems ready to unleash a torrent of statements, accusation and criticisms whenever trumped up charges are levelled against the Syrian Government.

The Syrian Government calls on the Secretariat to ensure full adherence to the principle of "stay and deliver" as affirmed by General Assembly resolutions adopted under the agenda items entitled "Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations" and "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel", and to continue its work in the city of Aleppo under existing coordination arrangements in full cooperation with the Syrian Government.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its commitment to working with national partners and United Nations agencies to meet the needs of the Syrian people, including the inhabitants of the city of Aleppo.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 69 (a) and 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/926

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 November 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 1 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for 30-31 October 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if these bulletins could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

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Letter dated 1 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (31 October 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours reconciliation agreements were signed with representatives of five villages in the Ladhiqiyah (3) and Hama (2) governorates.

The number of villages which have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 873.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in the village of Muaddamiyat al-Sham in Damascus governorate, and also in the Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to the adoption and fulfilment of the ceasefire conditions is unchanged — it is still 69.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 58 reports of shelling in the Aleppo (29), Damascus (18), Ladhiqiyah (5), Dar'a (4) and Hama (2) governorates.

Armed groups, after announcing the cessation of hostilities, used improvised multiple launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on the Antari and Mashariqah (twice) neighbourhoods in the city of Aleppo; the villages of Jawbar, Bala al-Qadimah, Harasta, Duma and Bilaliyah, farms near the village of Qusayr (twice) and the area at elevation point 612 in Damascus governorate; and the villages of Iqqo and Kharab al-Shaykh in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

In the villages of Basha and Ayn al-Qantarah in Ladhiqiyah governorate illegal armed groups used a drone fitted with an explosive device.

Armed units of terrorist groups using multiple launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms fired on the villages of Ansar (three times) and Bakrtayah, the "3000" (three times), Mashariqah, Ramusah (twice), Ansari, Arian and Dahiyat al-Assad neighbourhoods, the Assad military academy (eight times), the area of the former military school (twice), checkpoint No. 1 in the Mashariqah quarter and the Castello trade centre in Aleppo governorate.

In Damascus governorate, the following villages were shelled: Hawsh Nasri (twice), Harasta (twice), Irbin, Duma and Jawbar (four times).

In Der'a governorate, terrorists shelled the villages of Namir and Khirbat al-Ghazalah (twice). The fighters used a drone fitted with an explosive device in the village of Qunyah.

Armed groups shelled the villages of Muhradah and Mu'ardis in Hama governorate.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, the village of Ghuwaybarah was shelled.

The Russian aerospace forces and the Syrian air force did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which announced that they would cease hostilities and informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Civilians have received humanitarian aid in the village of Salhab in Hama governorate (1 tonne) and in the village of Suwayri in Homs governorate (4.5 tonnes).

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of the city of Aleppo which are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

On 30 October, irregular bands struck the Dahiyat al-Assad and al-Hamdaniyah districts of the city of Aleppo from the area of the "1070" neighbourhood with home-made shells containing a toxic substance.

Two Syrian servicemen were killed. At least 37 civilians were injured.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (30 October 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements were signed with representatives of three villages in Hama governorate.

The number of villages which have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 868.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in the Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to the adoption and fulfilment of the ceasefire conditions is unchanged — it is still 69.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 55 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in the Aleppo (30), Damascus (19), Ladhiqiyah (4), Dar'a (1) and Hama (1) governorates.

Armed groups, after announcing the cessation of hostilities, used improvised multiple launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on the village of Aziziyah in Aleppo governorate, the Antari neighbourhood in the city of Aleppo, the villages of Jawbar, Kafr Batna, Bala al-Qadimah, Harasta, Duma, Bilaliyah and Qusayr and the area at elevation point 612 in Damascus governorate, and the villages of Iqqo, Ayn al-Qantarah and Duwayr al-Akrad and government troop positions near the Abu Ali mountain range in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

Armed units of terrorist groups using improvised multiple launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars, grenade launchers and small arms fired on the villages of Ansar, Khadir and Hananu Shimaliyah in Aleppo governorate and also the Ramusah, "3000", Khalidiyah, al-Mashariqah, Shaykh Maqsud, Ansari, Maydan, "1070", Ashrafiyah, Sulayman al-Halabi and Dahiyat al-Assad neighbourhoods, the Assad military academy, checkpoint No. 1 in the Mashariqah quarter and the area of the former military school in the city of Aleppo.

In Damascus governorate the villages of Duma, Hawsh Nasri and Irbin, a sports ground in the village of Jawbar, a medical school in the village of Harasta and the Ibn al-Walid hospital were shelled.

In Dar'a governorate terrorists shelled the village of Jabha.

In Hama governorate the village of Muhradah was shelled.

The Russian aerospace forces and the Syrian air force did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which announced that they would cease hostilities and informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Humanitarian aid has been provided in the village of Ayn al-Jawzah in Ladhiqiyah governorate (3 tonnes), in the Shaykh Taha districts (2 tonnes) and from the Russian consulate for the Russian-speaking community (5 tonnes) in the city of Aleppo.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of the city of Aleppo which are under the control of illegal armed groups.

United Nations S/2016/927

Security Council

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2 November 2016
English
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Letter dated 27 October 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the Senegalese Presidency of the Security Council during November 2016, Senegal intends to hold an open debate at the ministerial level on the theme "Peace operations facing asymmetrical threats" on 7 November 2016 at 10 a.m.

In that regard, I wish to transmit to you the attached concept note for this meeting (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gorgui **Ciss**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 27 October 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Concept note for the Security Council open debate on the theme "Peace operations facing asymmetrical threats", to be held on 7 November 2016

Background

Today, most crises triggering the deployment of a peace operation are non-international conflicts. These are often referred to as internal or intra-State conflicts involving a confrontation between government forces and non-state armed groups.

As a consequence of this situation, the security environments of United Nations peacekeeping operations have become much more complex.

In many such environments, a broad range of armed groups pursue their criminal objectives via asymmetrical and terrorist operations. They regularly target United Nations personnel and civilians.

The actions of such groups are a major challenge not only for the security and safety of United Nations personnel, but also for the proper implementation of mandates. This is particularly true in the area of the protection of civilians for several United Nations peace operations and other operations authorized by the Security Council.

This is a reality now shared by several missions: the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). However, the magnitude of such threats is best illustrated in the case of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In Mali, despite the signing of a peace agreement between the Government and the main armed groups, MINUSMA operates in a difficult environment characterized by targeted attacks against United Nations personnel, civilians and civilian infrastructure.

According to the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, "during the reporting period, there was a significant increase in attacks against the Malian defence and security forces and MINUSMA, with 39 attacks perpetrated against the Malian forces, 27 attacks against MINUSMA and one attack against a MINUSMA contractor, compared to nine attacks against the Malian forces and 15 attacks against MINUSMA in the previous reporting period" (S/2016/819, para. 27).

A total of 34 peacekeepers were killed and 190 injured between January 2015 and November 2016.

The Security Council has the responsibility of deciding to establish peace operations and ensuring that the missions deployed in those environments have the full range of capabilities necessary to operate safely and fulfil their mandates effectively.

That is the thrust of the debate, the purpose of which is not, however, to engage peace operations in counter-terrorism activities.

Indeed, as the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations noted in its report, "United Nations peacekeeping missions, owing to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, among other aspects" (A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 119).

Therefore, in the debate, consideration should instead be given to the issue of adapting mission presence and activities to such environments, including by providing missions with the necessary capabilities to strengthen troop security on the ground and improving the effectiveness of their actions in response to asymmetrical threats.

The High-level Panel rightly recognized in its report that, "where asymmetric threats are present in the operating environment, United Nations missions must be provided with the necessary capabilities and training. In addition, an appropriate concept of operations and rules of engagement are required to protect themselves and deliver their mandates, including through preventive and pre-emptive postures and willingness to use force tactically to protect civilians and United Nations personnel" (ibid., para. 120).

In the light of the above, it must be acknowledged that there are many measures that can be taken not only in the context of adapting the presence and activities of peace operations to better prevent and counter asymmetric attacks, but also in how they can better support the efforts of the Government in this fight.

Need to adapt peace operations in environments with asymmetrical threats

Over the past decade the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States have sought to strengthen the mandate and capacity of United Nations peace operations in order to curb the increase in asymmetrical threats, particularly in the context of implementing civilian protection mandates.

In addition to defending itself against a significant direct threat from several extremist groups, MINUSMA has a mandate to prevent and deter attacks against civilians by armed groups. To that end, the Security Council has authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

A series of other peacekeeping operations, including MINUSCA, MONUSCO, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UNMISS and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) also have a capacity-building mandate for national institutions and actors, especially in the areas of the rule of law and the security sector. Along the same lines, such operations as MINUSMA, MONUSCO and MINUSCA are making use of modern military capabilities and technologies.

In line with Pillar III of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, United Nations peacekeeping operations often have a comparative advantage in the programmatic support they offer to institutions in the areas of the rule of law and security, in that they can contribute to efforts to strengthen capacities, inter alia, in judicial reform, the prevention of radicalization in detention centres, security sector reform, border control and policing.

In his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the Secretary-General stressed his intention to integrate preventing violent extremism into the relevant activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions, in accordance with their mandate, in order to strengthen the capacity of Member States through such mechanisms as the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, as well as programmes for security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

It is also worth looking at how they can provide more assistance to capacity-building in the host country in the prevention and mitigation of asymmetrical threats.

Need for innovative collaboration between peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism institutions

Terrorist threats have an increasing presence in zones where peace operations are deployed. Consequently, there are clear reasons to strengthen cooperation, coordination and synergies among United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and peacekeeping operations.

A number of Security Council documents (resolutions 2129 (2013), 2185 (2014), 2195 (2014) and 2242 (2015), and presidential statement S/PRST/2014/23) already provide a solid foundation for strengthening such inter-institutional cooperation. Those documents call upon the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the special envoys of the Secretary-General, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Development Programme, the Counter-Terrorism Task Force and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, as well as other relevant United Nations bodies, to strengthen their coordination and synergy, including by developing dialogue and the exchange of information, in particular during the mission planning and review phases.

Questions for the debate

How can a better understanding be developed of asymmetrical threats in the conduct of peace operations?

What is the strategy to reduce and even eliminate the impact of such threats on the security and effectiveness of peace operations in the fulfilment of their mandates?

How can Member States and the organizations and agencies of the United Nations system work closely together to confront such threats while delivering their respective mandates?

How can United Nations peace operations be given the technical and operational capacity to enable them to better adapt to asymmetrical environments?

How can such threats be better taken into account in the planning, concept definition and operational methods of those missions?

How can support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and corrections activities be adapted to such environments in order to strengthen the capacity of the host country?

Format

An open debate of the Security Council, at the ministerial level, open to Member States and representatives of regional and subregional organizations, under the presidency of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Mankeur NDIAYE.

Briefers

The Secretary-General of the United Nations; the Secretary-General of the International Organization of La Francophonie, Michaëlle Jean; and the Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Jean-Paul Laborde, will brief the Security Council during the open debate.

Outcome

Senegal plans to circulate a Chair's summary following the debate.

United Nations S/2016/928

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 November 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 2 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the thirty-seventh monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The report covers the period from 23 September to 22 October 2016.

On the matter of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, I must again report that no progress has been made. The Director-General's note to the OPCW Executive Council indicates that the poor security situation on the ground still prevents safe access to the remaining hangar and two stationary above-ground facilities by either the Syrian Arab Republic or the OPCW secretariat.

With regard to the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and subsequent submissions, I reiterate the need for the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW secretariat to work together to resolve all identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies.

Also with regard to the question of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that the Security Council, as communicated by the President of the Council in his letter dated 21 September 2016 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2016/807), approved a short-term extension of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, until 31 October 2016. This extension had been requested by the Mechanism in order to complete its fourth report to the Security Council pursuant to Council resolution 2235 (2015) (S/2016/806). The fourth report of the Mechanism was submitted on 21 October 2016.

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic is a matter of grave concern. I am alarmed by the weakening taboo against the use of such weapons and by the possibility of their use becoming normalized in this or any conflict, present or future. In order to avoid this intolerable outcome and to ensure that there is no impunity, it is imperative that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable. I look forward to the deliberations by the Security Council on this report.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-19169 (E) 031116

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Annex

Letter dated 25 October 2016 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 September to 22 October 2016 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Note by the Director-General

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) noting the Director-General's intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria, along with information on the Council's discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled "Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director General's intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.

4. This, the thirty-seventh monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions, and includes information relevant to the period from 23 September to 22 October 2016.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

5. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) The Secretariat has verified the destruction of 24 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the poor security situation continues to preclude safe access both for the Syrian Arab Republic to destroy the remaining aircraft hangar, which stands ready to accept the explosive charges, and for the Secretariat to confirm the condition of the two stationary above ground facilities. The planned annual routine maintenance of the remote monitoring systems, which are installed at four of the five destroyed underground structures, was carried out by the contracted company at the end of

September 2016. One of the systems that had been experiencing communications issues was repaired by representatives of the Secretariat on 2 October 2016. As part of the agreed yearly verification activities, Secretariat representatives are scheduled to visit the five destroyed underground structures at the end of November 2016 to monitor the integrity of the interior plugs.

(b) On 18 October 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its thirty fifth monthly report (EC-84/P/NAT.1, dated 19 October 2016) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC M 34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

6. As reported previously, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have now been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-81/DEC.4

7. As reported previously, the Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic have exchanged a number of communications in an effort to make progress in clarifying the outstanding issues with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration.

8. On 29 September 2016, the Director-General replied to the letter dated 30 August 2016 from the Head of the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic, in which the Syrian Arab Republic expressed a willingness to continue engagement on outstanding issues and provided partial replies to some of the questions addressed to it by the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT). In his letter, the Director-General explained that the new information did not substantively contribute to resolving the identified issues and, once again, called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to provide scientifically and technically plausible explanations on all outstanding issues, and to substantiate recently given information by providing original documentation and by making its senior officials involved in its chemical weapons programme available for meetings with the DAT. The Director-General also urged the Syrian Arab Republic to declare all relevant parts of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) under Articles III and VI of the Convention, to provide answers to all outstanding questions (including the presence of indicators of the previously undeclared chemical warfare agents), and to submit the outstanding redacted versions of the amendments to the initial declaration, as agreed during the April to June 2016 rounds of consultations.

9. In a letter dated 10 October 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic provided some additional responses to the Secretariat's questions and, in a letter dated 13 October 2016, it declared certain parts of the SSRC under Article III of the Convention. The Secretariat is currently reviewing the information and the amendment received. Pending this review, the Secretariat will provide its response to the Syrian Arab Republic.

Other activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

10. The Steering Committee, which is comprised of representatives from the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the Syrian

Arab Republic, discussed, inter alia, amending the tripartite agreement, during its meeting in Beirut held on 28 and 29 September 2016. Amendments to the agreements to extend until the end of May 2017 the support provided by UNOPS to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are expected to be concluded soon.

11. As requested by the Council at its Seventy Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat, on behalf of the Director-General, has continued to brief States Parties in The Hague on its activities.

12. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Supplementary resources

13. As previously reported, a Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, such as those of the DAT. As at the cut-off date of this report, contribution agreements totalling EUR 7.8 million had been concluded with Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Monaco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America, and the European Union. Pledges from other donors have been made and are currently being processed.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

14. Guided by Council decisions EC M 48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the FFM continued to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, with a particular focus on widely reported incidents in Saraqib (Idlib Governorate), and three incidents in Aleppo, Zubdiya, and Al Sukkari (Aleppo Governorate). The intensity of the ongoing conflict in Aleppo is a major challenge to the work of the FFM, which is reviewing and analysing pertinent information from all accessible sources.

15. In response to the request from the Syrian Arab Republic (letter dated 15 August 2016) for the FFM to investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons on 2 August 2016 in the area of Al-Awamid in Aleppo, a team was redeployed to Damascus from 12 to 19 October 2016 and conducted 25 interviews. The FFM will continue to work with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to gather more information.

16. On 13 October 2016, the Director-General provided an update with regard to the FFM's work to the Eighty-Third Session of the Council.

Conclusion

17. The main focus of the future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be on the implementation of Council decision EC 81/DEC.4 regarding declaration-related issues and on the activities of the FFM, as well as on the destruction and verification of the remaining aircraft hangar, confirmation of the status of the two stationary above ground facilities, and annual inspections of the underground structures already verified as destroyed.

United Nations S/2016/929

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 October 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of Ukraine on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 24 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations stating that Ms. Iryna Gerashchenko, First Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, will represent Ukraine at the 7793rd meeting of the Security Council, to be held on 25 October 2016.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

16-19240 (E) 041116

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United Nations A/71/600–S/2016/930

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
4 November 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 3 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government I am hereby transmitting for your attention the record of ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of October (see annex I).*

I am also transmitting for your attention the record of the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, as a result of the continued military aggression of Azerbaijan against the Republic, during the month of October (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

16-19315 (E) 081116

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Annex I to the letter dated 3 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-31 October 2016

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	3	AK: 16
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
2 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	5	AKM: 19
	Chinari	1	PK: 10
	Paravakar	1	SVD: 7
	Vazashen	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
3 October	Tavush Region	4	AK: 6
	Chinari	1	SVD: 17
	Paravakar	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Vazashen	1	
4 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	5	AK: 22
	Kayan	1	PK: 50
	Aygehovit	1	SVD: 7
	Vahan	2	
	Yeraskh	1	
5 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	6	AK: 32
	Movses	1	PK: 23
	Barekamavan	3	SVD: 12
	Jil	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
6 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	6	AK: 42
	Chinari	1	PK: 5
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Yeraskh	3	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
7 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	31	AK: 215
	Chinari	10	PK: 245
	Aygedzor	4	SVD: 35
	Aygepar	1	DShK: 43
	Movses	1	Black Arrow: 17 (Barekamavan 17)
	Vazashen	5	
	Barekamavan	5	
	Berdavan	1	
	Chambarak	3	
	Jil	1	
8 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	4	AK: 19
	Chinari	1	SVD: 14
	Aygehovit	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
9 October	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	10	AK: 267
	Chinari	3	PK: 440
	Aygedzor	1	DShK: 170
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	Istiglal: 3 (Jil 3)
	Kayan	1	Black Arrow: 4 (N. Karmiraghbyur 4)
	Chapni	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Jil	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
10 October	Ararat Region	1	AK: 1
	Yeraskh	1	
11 October	Syunik, Gegharkunik Region	7	PK: 15
	Chapni	6	DShK: 1 650
	Chambarak	1	Istiglal: 20 (Chapni 20)
12 October	Tavush Region	4	AK: 6
	Cinari	2	PK: 8
	Aygedzor	1	
	Vazashen	1	
13 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	7	AK: 9
	Chinari	2	PK: 115
	Paravakar	1	SVD: 6
	Vazashen	1	Istiglal: 7 (Daranak 7)
	Daranak	1	Black Arrow: 5 (Karchevan 5)
	Vahan	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Karchevan	1	
14 October	Tavush, Syunik Regions	16	AK, AKM: 421
	Aygedzor	4	PK: 106
	Chinari	6	SVD: 25
	Vazashen	1	DShK: 50
	Berdavan	1	
	Aygepar	2	
	Dovegh	1	
	Shaghat	1	
15 October	Tavush, Syunik Regions	7	AK: 22
	Chinari	3	PK: 15
	Aygedzor	1	SVD: 12
	Aygepar	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Agarak	1	
16 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	12	AK: 97
	Chinari	4	PK, RPK: 117
	Berdavan	1	SVD: 6
	Yeraskh	3	
	Agarak	2	
	Chambatrak	1	
	Vahan	1	
17 October	Tavush, Ararat, Syunik Regions	7	AK: 106
	Chinari	1	PK, RPK: 11
	Paravakar	2	SVD: 6
	Yeraskh	3	
	Agarak	1	
18 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	4	AKM: 11
	Chinari	1	PK: 4
	Paravakar	1	SVD: 1
	Yeraskh	2	
19 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	5	AK: 8
	Chinari	1	PK, RPK: 14
	Movses	2	SVD: 3
	Kutakan	1	
	Agarak	1	
20 October	Gegharkunik, Ararat, Syunik Regions	4	AK: 11
	Chambarak	1	PK: 300
	Yeraskh	2	DShK: 32

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Agarak	1	
21 October	Tavush Region	17	AKM: 21
	Chinari	8	PK, PKM: 110
	Aygedzor	1	SVD:11
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	DShK: 62
	Aygepar	4	Black Arrow: 12 (Chinari 12)
	Movses	2	
	Aygehovit	1	
22 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	10	AK: 15
	Chinari	5	PK: 132
	Aygedzor	1	SVD: 39
	Aygehovit	2	DShK: 55
	Paruyr Sevak	1	Black Arrow: 23 (Chinari 20; Aygedzor 3)
	Yeraskh	1	
23 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	8	AK: 212
	Aygedzor	1	PK: 490
	Chinari	1	DShK: 75
	Aygepar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Berd	1	
	Vahan	2	
	Chambarak	1	
24 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	AK: 82
	Aygedzor	2	DShK: 20
	Movses	1	Mortar 60 mm: 1 (Vahan 1)
	Vahan	1	
	Jil	1	
25 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	4	AK: 15/0
	Kayan	1	
	Yeraskh	3	
26 October	Tavush Region	1	AK: 3
	Berdavan	1	
27 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	5	AK: 23
	Aygedzor	1	Black Arrow: 1 (Paravakar 1)
	Paravakar	2	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
28 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	11	AK: 183
	Aygedzor	2	PK: 24

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Aygepar	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Movses	2	
	Yeraskh	2	
29 October	Tavush, Ararat Regions	9	AK: 53
	Chinari	2	PK: 10
	Aygedzor	1	SVD: 5
	Berkaber	2	Black Arrow: 1 (Aygedzor 1)
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
30 October	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	8	AKM: 25
	Aygedzor	1	PK: 99
	Aygehovit	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Jil	1	
	Yeraskh	3	
31 October	Tavush Region	4	AK, AKM: 45
	Aygedzor	1	PK: 8
	Chinari	1	DShK: 30
	Aygehovit	1	
	Baghanis	1	

15 October

1. At 12:10 in the vicinity of the village of Agarak, on the border with the Republic of Armenia, soldier Andranik Vahagn Vardanyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 3 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-31 October 2016

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	14	AK: 58 PK: 349 SVD: 1 DShK: 200 Istiglal: 50 (Ashaghi Veysali 10; Verin Chaylu 40) ZSU-23-4: 15 (Verin Chaylu 40)
2 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	AK: 149 PK: 7 SVD: 76 Istiglal: 2 (Mehdili 2)
3 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	AK: 240 PK: 73 SVD: 2
4 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	AK: 168 PK: 87 SVD: 29 Istiglal: 21 (Ashaghi Veysali 21)
5 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	AK: 183 PK: 3 114 SVD: 35 DShK: 500
6 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	24	AK: 644 PK: 162 SVD: 7 Istiglal: 25 (Kurapatkino 25) Black Arrow: 11 (Kurapatkino 1; Yarmja 10)
7 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	44	AK: 403 PK: 1 058 SVD, SAKO: 54 DShK: 771 Istiglal: 309 (Yarmja 4; Gyulistan 105; Choporlu 200)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
8 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	AK: 324 PK: 131 SVD: 28
9 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	AK: 483 PK: 152 SVD: 43 Istiglal: 16 (Kurapatkino 13; Verin Chaylu 3)
10 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	AK: 320 PK: 20 SVD: 25 Istiglal: 16 (Gyulistan 16)
11 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	AK: 141 PK: 76 SVD: 13 Istiglal: 2 (Verin Chaylu 2)
12 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	AK: 254 PK: 498 SVD: 14 Istiglal: 1 (Karvend 1)
13 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	AK: 572 PK: 270 SVD: 44 Istiglal: 17 (Mehdili 17)
14 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	25	AK, AKM: 351 PK: 91 SVD: 8 DShK: 9 Istiglal: 15 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 15)
15 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	13	AK: 64 PK: 285 SVD: 4 DShK: 20 Istiglal: 56 (Verin Chaylu 6; Talish 50)
16 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	17	AK: 91 PK: 116 SVD: 26 Istiglal: 1 (Nuzger 1)
17 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	AK: 215 PK: 137 SVD: 9 Istiglal: 20 (Seysulan 5; Gyulistan 15)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
18 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	14	AK, AKM: 126 PK: 91 SVD: 21
19 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	AK: 2 747 PK: 2 095 SVD: 15 DShK, NSVP, KPVT: 1 160 Istiglal: 23 (Mehdehli 5; Kengerli 15; Gyulistan 3)
20 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	27	AK: 64 PK: 100 SVD: 18 DShK: 45 Istiglal: 97 (Yarmja 85; Verin Chaylu 12)
21 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	43	AK, AKM: 1 159 PK: 1 315 SVD: 58 DShK: 200 Istiglal: 7 (Yarmja 2; Seysulan 5)
22 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	22	AK: 215 PK: 154 SVD: 11 Utyos: 8 Istiglal: 37 (Bash Karvend 2; Talish 35)
23 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	AK: 411 PK: 238 SVD: 6 DShK: 75 Istiglal: 4 (Mehdili 2; Taghibeyli 2)
24 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	22	AK: 567 PK: 247 SVD: 72 Istiglal: 5 (Yarmja 4; Seysulan 1)
25 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	17	AK: 95 PK: 145 SVD: 7 Istiglal: 3 (Mehdili 3)
26 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	9	AK: 61 PK: 181 Istiglal: 6 (Mehdili 5; Verin Chaylu 1)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
27 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	19	AK: 46 PK: 111 SVD: 16 DShK: 7 RPG-7, AGS-17: 14 (Tallish 14) Istiglal: 3 (Yarmja 3)
28 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	AK: 355 PK: 188 SVD: 34 DShK, NSVP, UTYOS: 141 Istiglal: 37 (Yarmja 25; Talish 12)
29 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	25	AK: 172 PK: 161 SVD: 5 DShK: 70 AGS-17: 1 (Darchinar 1) GP-25: 1 (Tallish 1) Istiglal: 30 (Tallish 9; Gyulistan 1; Yanshak 20) Black Arrow: 2 (Yusifjanli 2)
30 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	AK: 262 PK: 1 099 SVD: 23 Istiglal: 7 (Verin Chaylu 2; Gyulistan 5)
31 October	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	39	AK: 615 PK: 421 SVD: 24 Istiglal: 8 (Bash Karvend 5; Shurabad 2; Verin Chaylu 1)

6 October

1. At 12:30 in the vicinity of the village of Gyulistan, on the line of contact, soldiers Arsen Rubik Matosyan and Sargis Arcrun Harutyunyan were wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

7 October

1. At 12:30 in the vicinity of the village of Horadiz, on the line of contact, soldier Hayk Levon Hambarcumyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

10 October

1. At 08:30 in the vicinity of the village of Yusifjanli, on the line of contact, soldier Artak Arsen Muradyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

11 October

1. At 12:10 in the vicinity of the village of Karvend, on the line of contact, soldier Sanasar Mavrik Grigoryan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

20 October

1. At 23:30 in the vicinity of the village of Nuzger, two Azerbaijani special units had attempted to cross the line of contact but retreated as a result of actions by the NKR armed forces.

2. At 13:05 in the vicinity of the village of Yarmja, on the line of contact, soldier Hrant Karen Babayan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

3. At 13:10 a service car was damaged as a result of fire from the Azerbaijani side.

4. At 23:30 in the vicinity of the village of Nuzger, on the line of contact, during exchange of fire with Azerbaijani special units, soldier Khachik Ruben Adamyan was wounded.

26 October

1. At 17:00 in the vicinity of the village of Talish, on the line of contact, soldier Gurgen Avetiq Ayvazyan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

2. At 27:00 in the vicinity of the village of Talish, on the line of contact, soldier Vazgen Norik Movsisyan was wounded.

28 October

1. At 12:50 in vicinity of the village of Talish, on the line of contact, soldier Shiraz Nikolay Arzumanyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 25 June to 4 November 2016

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report of 24 June 2016 (S/2016/572).

2. The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally calm, including in the context of the tenth anniversary of the July-August 2006 conflict and related rhetoric on both sides. Tensions rose among communities in the Shab'a area during construction works conducted by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line in the Shab'a Farms. Israeli and Lebanese authorities maintained their commitment to resolution 1701 (2006), the cessation of hostilities and stability along the Blue Line. My Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL continued to engage accordingly. There was no progress, however, on the parties' outstanding obligations under the resolution and towards a permanent ceasefire.

3. The resilience of Lebanon is increasingly contingent upon and at risk from the Syrian conflict. The security situation remained relatively calm thanks in large part to the continuing robust performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces along the Syrian border and with other security services in counter-terrorism operations throughout the country. Nonetheless, the threat of terrorist attacks persisted, as illustrated in the two suicide bombings in Al-Qa'ah on 27 June and the bombing in Zahlah on 31 August. The situation in the border areas remained fragile, with the Lebanese Armed Forces engaged in ongoing operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Nusrah Front militants.

4. During the reporting period, there was a breakthrough in the resolution of the two-and-a-half-year vacancy of the presidency of Lebanon, as a result of which the Government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam became a caretaker government. Agreement on a new government and its ministerial statement remains pending, however, while preparations for the 2017 parliamentary elections are ongoing. In my meeting with Prime Minister Salam on 20 September, in the margin of the General Assembly, I expressed my hope for the election of a president of the

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Republic and for a functioning government and parliament for Lebanon. We discussed the ongoing impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon and welcomed the united international support for the country's security and stability, including through assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. I also thanked Lebanon for its generous hospitality to refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic and stressed the need for the international community to do more to share the responsibility of assisting their presence in Lebanon.

5. The number of Syrian refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon remained stable, owing to the policy put in place by the Government in 2014 and 2015 to restrict access to exceptional humanitarian cases only. As at 31 October, 1,033,513 Syrian refugees were registered with UNHCR, including 47,138 in the UNIFIL area of operations. At the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, held on 20 September, Prime Minister Salam highlighted the severe problems posed by the refugee crisis to the country's stability, security, economy and public services, emphasizing that Lebanon could not cope with such an "existential challenge" alone.

6. The situation in the Palestinian refugee camps remained generally calm, except in Ein El Helweh camp, where tensions flared following the surrender to the Lebanese Armed Forces of dozens of Palestinian individuals suspected of involvement in militant activities since 24 July. On 22 September, on an exceptional basis, the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted an operation inside Ein El Helweh camp to arrest a Palestinian national, suspected of being a prominent member of ISIL, who was planning terrorist attacks in Lebanon. My Special Coordinator visited that camp to support efforts to keep stability there.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

7. On 19 August, after tensions had built for some days, approximately 200 individuals, including a number of journalists, gathered in the vicinity of United Nations position 4-7C, south of Shab'a village, to protest against works by the Israel Defense Forces to prepare a driveable track in the disputed Shab'a Farms area south of the Blue Line, which had commenced on 7 August. Prior to the demonstration, UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces personnel engaged closely with the local communities to mitigate tensions and prevent incidents along the Blue Line. During the gathering, 100 individuals, led by a local member of Parliament, crossed south of the Blue Line despite warnings by personnel from the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL. Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces personnel remained at some distance from the Blue Line. Demonstrators returned north of the Blue Line soon after, without any incident. Subsequently, UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces activities in the area focused on further reducing tensions.

8. During the reporting period, Blue Line ground violations were mainly committed by shepherds with their flocks in the Shab'a Farms and Bastrah areas

(Sector East) and by farmers cultivating their fields in the Rumaysh area (Sector West), despite warnings from UNIFIL. On 16 July, Israel Defense Forces fired a warning shot in the air and briefly seized a shepherd's flock that had crossed south of the Blue Line in the Shab'a Farms area. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently released the flock. Following previously observed seasonal patterns, Lebanese civilians violated the Blue Line while swimming in the Al Wazzani River. On two occasions, groups of three and six persons, respectively, crossed south of the Blue Line while taking photographs in the vicinity of Udaysah, Mays al-Jabal and Hula (Sector East). Lebanese civilian construction workers crossed south of the Blue Line on several occasions when installing drainage pipes and paving the access road to a well in the Blida area (Sector East). On 18 August, UNIFIL observed four members of the Lebanese Armed Forces intelligence branch crossing approximately 10 metres south of the Blue Line for about five minutes in the vicinity of Rumaysh.

9. UNIFIL generally enjoyed freedom of movement throughout the area of operations. In a few isolated incidents, UNIFIL encountered unfriendly behaviour and obstruction of movement, predominantly in Sector West. In the most serious incident, during the night of 28 August, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a group of more than 40 individuals in Bint Jubayl (Sector West), who alleged that the patrol had taken photographs of the community. A standoff with the crowd developed during which the patrol was subjected to threatening behaviour, and some of the vehicles' tyres were deflated. The situation was resolved with the assistance of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

10. In another incident on 28 September, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol observed from a distance nine men in civilian dress, carrying cameras and wooden sticks, violate the Blue Line north-east of Kfar Kila. Subsequently, the men who had crossed the Blue Line ran towards the Observer Group Lebanon vehicle, surrounded it, and damaged the car by throwing stones and using their sticks. There were no injuries to personnel and the patrol was able to leave the scene. Later the same day, some of the nine men sustained injuries when they hit a mine approximately 2 km north of United Nations position 9-64 in an area close to the Blue Line.

11. The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander emphasized to Lebanese Armed Forces interlocutors that the mandate of UNIFIL requires it to have freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces strives to ensure that the local population understands that UNIFIL can and must patrol unimpeded on its own in the area of operations.

12. UNIFIL continued to observe civilians with unauthorized weapons, mostly for hunting, in the area of operations. With the onset of the hunting season, the incidents significantly increased, mainly in the areas of Bastrah, Mays al-Jabal and Blida (Sector East). On 16 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces called upon Lebanese citizens to abide by a ban on hunting and to refrain from carrying weapons of any kind in the area south of the Litani River. On 18 September, UNIFIL observed two armed hunters in Dibil (Sector West) who were apprehended by Lebanese Armed Forces personnel. On several occasions, UNIFIL observed the presence or firing of small arms, including during weddings and funerals. In all cases, UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of the violations.

13. The Israel Defense Forces continued to allege that Hizbullah continues to maintain military infrastructure and equipment in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL monitors the area of operations and the Blue Line and reports all violations of resolution 1701 (2006) that it observes, including the presence of unauthorized armed personnel or weapons. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search private property for weapons in the south unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity from that location. Where specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel, weapons or infrastructure inside its area of operations, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act with all means available within its mandate and capabilities. To date, UNIFIL has neither been provided with, nor found, evidence of the unauthorized transfer of arms into its area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces command continued to confirm that it would act immediately to put a stop to any illegal activity in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006) and relevant Government decisions.

14 Israel continued to violate Lebanese airspace almost daily, mostly with unmanned aerial vehicles, but also with fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL protested to the Israel Defense Forces about the overflights and called upon the Government of Israel to stop them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested against the air violations to UNIFIL.

15. The Israeli occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line continued, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. To date, Israel has not responded to the proposal submitted by UNIFIL to both parties in 2011 concerning security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL in July 2011 of their agreement to the proposal.

16. The relations between UNIFIL and the local population remained positive and the Mission met regularly with its representatives. In addition to holding separate meetings with religious and municipal representatives, UNIFIL continued to implement quick-impact projects focused on improving access to basic services, facilitating the economic and social development of the local communities and promoting the empowerment of women. UNIFIL continued to support capacity-building of the Lebanese Civil Defence in firefighting and civil-military cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL contingents provided medical, dental and veterinary assistance to the local population.

17. The Lebanese Armed Forces maintained two brigades in the area south of the Litani River. In the light of the tense security situation along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic, the Lebanese Armed Forces maintained a reinforced presence in the north-eastern part of the UNIFIL area of operations (Shab'a village and the Arqub area). During the tensions that occurred in the area of Shab'a Farms, the Lebanese Armed Forces temporarily deployed reinforcements. As part of a rotation of troops in the country, the Lebanese Armed Forces replaced the brigade in Sector East of the UNIFIL area of operations in October.

18. UNIFIL conducted an average of 13,337 operational activities each month throughout the area of operations, including patrols, checkpoints and observation tasks. The number of operational activities carried out by UNIFIL in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at around 10 per cent. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to conduct foot patrols ("market walks") in villages and urban areas, providing opportunities for regular direct contact between peacekeepers and the local population.

19. In accordance with its mandate, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, which currently comprises two frigates, three corvettes and two fast patrol boats, carried out maritime interdiction activities and provided training for the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy. During the reporting period, the Maritime Task Force hailed 2,039 ships. The Lebanese authorities inspected and cleared 516 vessels. UNIFIL conducted a total of 312 joint exercises, workshops and training courses with the Lebanese Armed Forces, of which 209 were conducted with their Navy, contributing to enhancing operational capabilities and effectiveness, including on maritime interdiction, the use of coastal radar, boarding and medical support, as well as mutual understanding of operations.

20. The Maritime Task Force maintained a visible presence in the southern part of the area of maritime operations to prevent tensions between Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL does not have a mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which was installed unilaterally by Israel and is not recognized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations. The Israel Defense Forces continued to carry out frequent maintenance activities at the buoys, at times with divers. On several occasions, Israel Defense Forces patrol boats south of the line of buoys fired machine gun rounds or flares and dropped explosive charges to turn away Lebanese fishing boats.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

21. The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander was in frequent contact with Lebanese and Israeli authorities and facilitated two tripartite meetings, including on ways to explore concrete solutions to local sources of tension and thereby contribute to building trust between the two sides. In the tripartite forum and in bilateral meetings with UNIFIL, the parties consistently conveyed and demonstrated their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to respect and maintain stability along and across the Blue Line. Both sides stated to UNIFIL their keen interest in not letting developments in the Syrian Arab Republic destabilize the situation in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

22. Nevertheless, tensions occasionally increased in the vicinity of the Blue Line, in particular in response to the works carried out by the Israel Defense Forces in the Shab'a Farms area, south of the Blue Line. Following the initial communication to UNIFIL by the Israel Defense Forces that they would commence construction works on 7 August, UNIFIL immediately requested details on the nature, purpose and scope of the proposed works, and asked the Israel Defense Forces to allow time for coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces protested strongly to UNIFIL against the works, which it considered to be located inside the occupied Lebanese Shab'a Farms and to affect the nature of the terrain and change its features. The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander

remained in ongoing contact with both sides, with a view to finding an agreed and coordinated way forward, reducing tensions in the area on the Lebanese side and preventing incidents. The matter was discussed twice in tripartite meetings on 25 August and 22 September, while the works were ongoing. UNIFIL maintained an enhanced presence in the area, including with observers from Observer Group Lebanon, and intensified its monitoring activity. The Lebanese Armed Forces also monitored the situation, including by deploying reinforcements to the area prior to a demonstration announced for 21 August, thereby preventing further violations of the Blue Line and maintaining calm among the population to the extent possible.

23. The parties continued to actively engage in a constructive manner in the tripartite meetings regularly facilitated by UNIFIL, during which they addressed violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), including ground violations, Israeli air violations and the continued occupation of northern Ghajar. The parties also raised activities that had been considered provocations by the other side. A key objective of the Force's engagement, through the tripartite mechanism and bilaterally, was to assist the parties in finding mutually agreeable security arrangements and confidence-building measures to mitigate the scope for tensions or incidents in sensitive areas along the Blue Line, including those linked to seasonal agricultural activities.

24. Throughout the period, UNIFIL encouraged the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces to use more proactively the established liaison mechanism to share information on planned activities and deployments, in particular in sensitive areas along the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces notified UNIFIL of an exercise in the Arqub area on 15 September well in advance, which allowed UNIFIL to duly inform the Israel Defense Forces and to be present on both sides of the Blue Line throughout the exercise.

25. UNIFIL continued its efforts with the parties to mark the Blue Line visibly on the ground. UNIFIL demining teams supported the marking process by clearing access lanes through minefields to six marker locations. Construction of 4 markers were completed, while 20 are under construction; 51 points are in the measuring phase and 15 points remain to be verified by the parties. In addition, UNIFIL continued to refurbish markers to ensure that they were intact and could fulfil their function. As a result, the total figure for Blue Line work progress, as at 17 October 2016, was 325 demined, 273 measured, 255 constructed, 238 verified and 184 refurbished.

26. There continues to be no progress towards the establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv.

27. As part of the strategic dialogue process with the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL pursued efforts to promote assistance by international donors to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the UNIFIL area of operations. Together with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, UNIFIL participated in the Lebanese Armed Forces Executive Military Commission and consulted with representatives of international donors in Beirut, with a view to facilitating resource mobilization for the Lebanese Armed Forces in support of responsibilities under resolution 1701 (2006).

28. In its resolution 2305 (2016), the Security Council, bearing in mind the strategic priorities and recommendations identified in my letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the strategic review of UNIFIL, expressed the need for a follow-up and update. In addition, the Council requested me, in accordance with global peacekeeping best practice, to conduct a strategic review of UNIFIL, examining the structure of its uniformed and civilian components and related resources, in an effort to ensure that the Force is configured most appropriately to fulfil its mandated tasks. In that regard, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will consult with a number of Member States and troop-contributing countries, as well as UNIFIL, on the best way forward. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in close coordination with UNIFIL, intends to complete the review by February 2017. I intend to present its major findings and conclusions to the Council once the review is finalized.

C. Disarming armed groups

29. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of Lebanon continued to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. In a statement to the Security Council on 12 July, the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that Hizbullah had never stopped its military build-up and had only enhanced its military arsenal since the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006), asserting that the group now possessed more than 120,000 rockets and missiles, compared with 7,000 rockets in 2006. He further asserted that Hizbullah had transformed the villages of southern Lebanon into terror outposts by placing rocket launchers and storing missiles in civilian areas, and warned that Israel would defend its citizens in the most vigorous and forceful way possible against any "miscalculation" by Hizbullah. In a speech on 13 August, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, spoke of the continued mutual deterrence between Hizbullah and Israel, reiterating that there was not a single point in occupied Palestine that could not be targeted by the rockets of the resistance in Lebanon. On 6 October, the head of Hizbullah's parliamentary bloc, Mohammed Raad, publicly stated that the resistance was growing in strength, equipment and hardware, and training on new weapons they had not used before.

30. Since 1 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces and security services were reported to have arrested 217 individuals suspected of affiliation with extremist groups or involvement in terrorist activities throughout Lebanon, bringing the total number of terrorism-related arrests since January to more than 1,700. On 2 September, two Syrian intelligence officers were indicted for their alleged involvement in the twin suicide bombings against two Sunni mosques in Tripoli in 2013. On 14 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the General Security Directorate reportedly arrested members of 10 terrorist sleeper cells in various parts of the country suspected of plotting attacks during Ashura, including two would-be ISIL suicide bombers preparing attacks against religious sites in Beirut's southern suburb. The security authorities also reportedly dismantled a terror cell and identified a weapons warehouse in Bhamdun that supplied ISIL and the Nusrah Front, confiscating a large cache of arms. On 18 October, the authorities arrested a senior member of the Nusrah Front in Arsal. On 20 October, the General Security Directorate announced the arrest of eight Syrian nationals for belonging to terrorist

groups and for allegedly preparing a series of suicide attacks against UNIFIL patrols as well as in tourist areas.

31. There was no progress in the dismantling of the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, which continue to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to effectively monitor and control parts of the border.

32. On 9 October, the Arab Tawhid Party announced the formation of the "Tawhid Brigades" to operate in all Lebanese regions alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces and security services. The announcement came amid reports of localized initiatives at self-defence in various localities, including in the aftermath of the attacks in Al-Qa'ah.

33. The situation in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein El Helweh remained tense in the context of ongoing intelligence efforts by the Lebanese Armed Forces and Palestinian factions to curtail the presence of extremist groups. On 26 July, the Lebanese Armed Forces reportedly thwarted plans by ISIL and the Nusrah Front to perpetrate terrorist attacks inside and outside the camp, including in Sayda and Beirut. From 24 July onward, some 60 individuals, including 10 prominent figures suspected of affiliation with militant groups, surrendered to the Lebanese Armed Forces as part of a deal between the Lebanese authorities and Palestinian factions. The assassination on 19 September of a Palestinian accused of being a Lebanese Armed Forces informant triggered unrest in the camp that caused institutions affiliated with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to close for two days. On 22 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested alleged ISIL "emir" Imad Yassine, a Palestinian national suspected of staging a bombing campaign across Lebanon on behalf of terrorist organizations, inside Ein El Helweh camp.

34. On 14 September, the Government of Lebanon, with the support of my Special Coordinator, launched nationwide consultations to develop a national plan of action for the prevention of violent extremism. Based on the United Nations prevention of violent extremism strategy in Lebanon, consultations are expected to involve a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society, to enable the Lebanese authorities to adopt practical preventive measures.

D. Arms embargo and border control

35. Assertions of ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah continued. In a speech on 24 June, Hizbullah leader Nasrallah stated that the budget of Hizbullah, its salaries, expenses, weapons and arsenal were all from the Islamic Republic of Iran and that the money reached Hizbullah just like it received the rockets with which it threatened Israel, and thanked the Islamic Republic of Iran for its support. Referencing those statements in a letter addressed to me dated 5 July, the Permanent Representative of Israel asked me to demand that the Islamic Republic of Iran comply with resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004) and stop transferring weapons to terrorist organizations. The United Nations takes the allegations seriously, particularly given the statements by the Secretary General of Hizbullah, but is not in a position to verify them independently.

36. Hizbullah remained openly engaged in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, and others from Lebanon are also reported to have joined armed groups fighting there. Also in his speech on 24 June, Hassan Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah would increase its "large" presence in Aleppo and would remain engaged in the fighting there, noting that it was not possible to separate Lebanon from developments in the region, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.

37. There was a further decrease in recorded instances of cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon, including nine incidents of shooting and nine incidents of shelling. But the situation along the border remained tense, with the Lebanese Armed Forces conducting ongoing operations against threats and infiltration attempts from armed extremists. Clashes with militants, including ISIL and the Nusrah Front, concentrated around the towns of Arsal, R'as Ba'albak and Al-Qa'ah. On 15 August, a roadside bomb targeted a Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle outside Arsal, lightly wounding five soldiers. On 16 October, a Lebanese Armed Forces officer was killed in Arsal by suspected ISIL militants. Hizbullah also continued to engage in fighting with ISIL and the Nusrah Front in the border area, and an increased number of clashes took place between militants from ISIL and the Nusrah Front.

38. The security plans for Tripoli, the Biqa' governorate and southern Beirut continued to be implemented. On 27 June, eight suicide bombers detonated themselves in the north-eastern border town of Al-Qa'ah, killing five other people. There was no claim of responsibility for the attack, the first in a Christian village in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian conflict. Prime Minister Salam publicly asked residents to refrain from "chaotic self-defence". Interior Minister Machnouk stated that the attackers were not from among the local Syrian refugees, and concerns regarding retaliatory attacks against refugees did not materialize. On 14 July, three suspects were charged with involvement in the attack. On 31 August, a roadside bomb exploded in the nearby town of Zahlah, killing one woman. On 11 October, the military prosecutor charged Sheikh Bassam Tarras in relation with the bombing on suspicion of links with ISIL militants. On 19 October, my Special Coordinator visited the north-eastern border area, including Al-Qa'ah, Zahlah, Harmal and Labwah, in support of the moderation shown by local residents following the attacks and the work of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

39. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to update their capabilities development plan to better respond to security challenges. International assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces continued, including the delivery of equipment worth more than $50 million from the United States of America and continued assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and others to strengthen the border capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Efforts to complete the deployment of land border regiments and watchtowers along the entirety of the border continued to progress. By 30 September, outstanding senior military appointments were confirmed, including the extension of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Kahwaji for another year.

40. Further to the London Conference on Syria, the Lebanese authorities reviewed the regulatory framework governing access by Syrian refugees to the labour market. They replaced the "pledge not to work", which was to be signed by all refugees, with a "pledge to abide by Lebanese law" to allow for the legal employment of

Syrian refugees in authorized sectors. Discussions are ongoing regarding the temporary waiving of residency fees. UNHCR and the Ministry of Social Affairs are working on a "certificate of attestation" that would clarify the legal status of refugees and give them more mobility in Lebanon.

41. Despite the level of international assistance, self-reliance among the refugees is not achieved and refugees are surviving on the bare minimum, having exhausted their limited resources. Some 71 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the poverty line, marked by precarious food intake and nutrition and housing issues. Some 30 per cent of the Lebanese population also live below the poverty line and 10 per cent live in extreme poverty.

42. As at 30 August, available resources for Lebanon stood at $1.57 billion, with $1.22 billion already disbursed or committed for 2016. That includes $979 million provided to United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations for the 2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which is now 47 per cent funded. That marks an increase of 48 per cent in international funding for Lebanon since June. At the first steering committee meeting of the Concessional Financing Facility in Beirut on 28 July, Lebanon presented three priority projects and requested $293 million in concessional loan support.

43. The number of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic decreased from 40,000 to 30,000 people. An estimated 65 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon and 90 per cent of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic live in poverty, and unemployment reaches 23 per cent among the former and 53 per cent among the latter. On 6 October, the European Union announced a new allocation of $13 million for the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared camp.

44. On 5 October, the United Nations strategic framework for Lebanon for 2017-2020 was formally adopted by the Government of Lebanon. Based on a "whole-of-Lebanon" approach, the framework outlines an integrated response by the United Nations system in Lebanon to help address threats to stability, prevent conflict and improve socioeconomic prospects.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

45. Five manual mine-clearance teams, one explosive ordnance disposal team and one mechanical mine-clearance team continued to be deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations. UNIFIL demining teams cleared 1,208 m^2 of land to provide access to Blue Line points and destroyed 23 items. The United Nations Mine Action Service conducted 56 quality assurance visits to demining sites and nine safety monitoring visits to refurbishment sites, as well as five landmine/explosive remnants of war safety training sessions. The Mine Action Service handed over demining equipment to the Lebanon Mine Action Centre. In response to the mine incident of 14 September, UNIFIL identified additional measures to mitigate the risk of future incidents related to landmines and/or explosive remnants of war.

F. Delineation of borders

46. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border during the reporting period, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed. There was likewise no progress on the Shab'a Farms. In a statement to the Security Council on 12 July, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon reiterated the country's readiness to work towards closing the chapter of the Shab'a Farms and Kfar Shuba Hills occupation by Israel, recalling that his Government welcomed the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641) as a starting point. However, there has still been no reaction from Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic to that proposal.

G. Political and institutional stability

47. Consistent with the statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 July (S/PRST/2016/10), my Special Coordinator conducted intensified contacts with Lebanese, regional and international parties, including through the International Support Group for Lebanon in Beirut, with the aim of helping Lebanon overcome its political and institutional crisis. My Special Coordinator continued to regularly convene the representatives of the Group in Beirut. Following a joint meeting with Prime Minister Salam on 15 September, my Special Coordinator and the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council in Beirut called on all Lebanese parties to enable government institutions to function effectively and to proceed with the election of a president, and welcomed the intention of the Government to take steps to ensure that the 2017 parliamentary elections were held on time.

48. As noted by Prime Minister Salam in his address to the General Assembly on 22 September, Lebanon has been undergoing a severe political crisis, the apex of which was the inability of Parliament to elect a president. He stressed that the crisis had led to a quasi-paralysis of the legislative authority and to a slowdown of the work of the executive, and had had negative repercussions on the State's economic situation.

49. Systematic political obstruction by some parties, often accompanied by inflammatory language, has been particularly damaging, as it invites divisions along sectarian lines. On 25 August, the Free Patriotic Movement announced its boycott of Cabinet meetings and of the parliamentary dialogue, and threatened to hold mass street protests. The dialogue between the Future Movement and Hizbullah and the parliamentary dialogue process continued under the auspices of Speaker Nabih Berri, but the latter stalled after its most recent session on 5 September. The Cabinet convened only a dozen meetings, mostly on technical matters, owing to open disagreement among its members and threats of resignation or suspension of participation by some Ministers.

50. On 31 October, Parliament elected Free Patriotic Movement founder Michel Aoun as President of Lebanon, and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri was designated as Prime Minister on 3 November, following the announcement on 20 October by Mr. Hariri of his endorsement of Mr. Aoun for the presidency. Prime

Minister Salam continued to head the current Cabinet in a caretaker capacity pending agreement on a new government. Consultations on the formation and ministerial statement of a new government are ongoing.

51. On 19 October, after more than a year of inactivity, Parliament held a rare legislative session to pass urgent financial bills as well as a law on the establishment of the country's first national human rights institution. Preparations for parliamentary elections in May 2017 are ongoing.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

52. UNIFIL continually reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures, particularly following security threat warnings, and closely coordinated them with the Lebanese authorities. In the Arqub area (Sector East), strict security measures have remained in place for official movements by United Nations personnel, which require an armed security escort. Commemorative shooting during gatherings and funerals continued to pose a risk to UNIFIL personnel and the local population. During times of heightened tensions in the Ein El Helweh Palestinian refugee camp, UNIFIL adjusted its movements between the area of operations and Beirut.

53. On 14 September, while reversing, an armoured UNIFIL vehicle carrying five UNIFIL military personnel hit a mine next to a frequently used dirt road in the vicinity of Ibil al-Saqi (Sector East). The armoured vehicle protected the personnel, who were uninjured, but the vehicle suffered significant damage. Lebanese Armed Forces provided support in securing the site. In response to the incident, all military and civilian UNIFIL personnel were advised to use only main roads for movement in the area of operations.

54. UNIFIL continued to monitor ongoing proceedings at the Lebanese Military Court against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers in 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2014.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

55. As at 16 October, UNIFIL comprised 10,561 military personnel, including 387 women, from 40 troop-contributing countries, and 238 international and 579 national civilian staff, including 72 and 144 women, respectively. In addition, 48 military observers, including 3 women, of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization were under operational control of UNIFIL.

V. Conduct and discipline

56. UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon continued to strengthen existing preventive measures against sexual exploitation and abuse. The United Nations country team on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse network, which emphasizes accountability and a victim-centred approach

to implementing the sexual exploitation and abuse zero-tolerance policy, met to review the current measures and the risk assessment for Lebanon. No allegations of sexual exploitation and/or abuse have been received by either UNIFIL or the Office of the Special Coordinator. Pending the development of a suitable complaints mechanism, the network serves as an effective forum to address any allegation of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, involving all categories of United Nations personnel.

VI. Observations

57. I welcome the election of a president of the Republic as the result of persistent efforts among political leaders to arrive at a Lebanese-owned solution, and I congratulate Michel Aoun on assuming the presidency. The filling of the presidential vacancy is a long-awaited step in overcoming the country's political and institutional crisis. It is my hope that it can now pave the way for broader political progress, without which Lebanon will remain in a state of paralysis. The formation of a united and functioning government and the on-time holding of parliamentary elections are essential for the viability and credibility of any effort to overcome the current crisis. It is a matter of accountability towards the citizens of Lebanon and of responsibility towards the country's international partners. A government formed and mandated on the basis of respect for the country's commitment to the principles and undertakings that have underpinned its stability and standing will be important to give Lebanon clear direction with the continued support of the international community. The election of a president, the formation of a functioning and united government and the holding of parliamentary elections by May 2017 will test the capacity of the Lebanese polity to return Lebanon to the constitutional and democratic process and to restore confidence, domestically and internationally, in its stability.

58. In that context, I commend Speaker Berri for his efforts to foster political dialogue. I also thank Prime Minister Salam for his leadership throughout the challenging period without a president and for his continued dedication as he steers the Cabinet through the sensitive caretaker phase. As called for by the Security Council, I urge Lebanese parties to adhere to the State's Constitution and National Pact. I appeal to all Lebanese leaders to resort to constructive dialogue, including through existing mechanisms, in negotiating a compromise agreement to end the political and institutional crisis. I also urge all parties to refrain from encouraging or engaging in any discourse that could fuel political or sectarian tensions at this sensitive time.

59. Building on the continued commitment of Lebanon and Israel to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), I encourage both parties to consider, with my Special Coordinator and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, mutual confidence-building measures and steps that can help sustain the calm and stability that have prevailed over the last 10 years. In the current violent and unstable regional context, I urge both Lebanon and Israel not to lose sight of the central objective of a permanent ceasefire as envisaged in the resolution, which remains the best guarantee for long-term stability.

60. I welcome the relative calm that continued to prevail in the UNIFIL area of operations and across the Blue Line, in large part due to the commitment and efforts of both Lebanon and Israel and their overall close coordination and cooperation with UNIFIL. The strategic environment in southern Lebanon that UNIFIL, in close cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, established following the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006), has proven its strength and viability over the years in a vastly changed regional environment.

61. I welcome the engaged participation in the tripartite forum by both parties, but also call upon them to proactively make use of the UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanism to exchange information in real time that may contribute to preventing misunderstandings and heightened tensions on either side of the Blue Line. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces for notifying UNIFIL of a military exercise in a timely manner, such that it enabled the Mission to liaise effectively with the Israel Defense Forces and to deploy its personnel in the area. That was all the more important owing to the heightened tensions in the area resulting from works being carried out by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line. I call upon the Israel Defense Forces to make the utmost use of UNIFIL channels to allow it to liaise with the Lebanese Armed Forces and do what is necessary to prevent a rise of tensions in sensitive areas along the Blue Line.

62. I am encouraged by the ongoing cooperation of the parties with UNIFIL on the visible marking of the Blue Line. I call upon both sides to keep in mind the strategic importance of the process for maintaining the cessation of hostilities. Full respect for the Blue Line is a critical factor in maintaining calm and stability in the area and any deliberate violation of the Blue Line is unacceptable.

63. The occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line has continued, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I once again remind the Israeli authorities of their obligation, in accordance with the resolution, to withdraw their armed forces from the area. I urge them to engage closely with UNIFIL to that end.

64. I remain seriously concerned that Israel continues to violate Lebanese airspace on an almost daily basis, in complete disregard of the sovereignty of Lebanon and the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). I once again call upon the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory and territorial waters.

65. It is the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, as the host Government, to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel. I welcome the overall positive relationship between UNIFIL and the local population and the coordinated efforts by the Mission and the Lebanese Armed Forces to reach out to communities and raise awareness of the Force's right and need for freedom of movement throughout the area of operations.

66. The mine that exploded under a UNIFIL vehicle is a stark reminder of the dangers mines from past conflicts continue to pose for many years. The incident underlines the importance of troops having adequate equipment at their disposal, which in this case saved their lives.

67. I reiterate the importance of continued close collaboration between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). It

is a strategic priority to further enhance the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces for tasks mandated under the resolution in the UNIFIL area of operations on land and at sea.

68. Rhetoric by any party threatening to use force undermines the relative calm and stability that has been achieved between Lebanon and Israel in the past 10 years, as it only exacerbates the risk of tension or miscalculation that could lead to conflict. It also hinders the need to move past the current precarious status quo. Hizbullah's open acknowledgement of being in possession of a growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons, which it claims is supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran and serves as a deterrent to potential Israeli aggression, contravenes resolution 1701 (2006) and remains of serious concern. It will be vital to ensure that the national defence strategy and other outstanding elements of the resolution be addressed in the framework of the national dialogue. The implementation of earlier decisions of the national dialogue is also overdue, specifically those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

69. The reaching of the 10-year mark since the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006) and the continued threat of terrorism underscore the need to bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces with effective assistance. At a time when armed non-State actors across the region are contesting the foundations of regional stability, the Lebanese Armed Forces remain a pillar of the country's stability and a key agent of the extension of State authority throughout Lebanon. I therefore welcome the consensus across the Lebanese political spectrum in support of the role of the army and security services. The capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, however, continue to be stretched. I welcome the assistance delivered bilaterally to the Lebanese Armed Forces as a sign of confidence in its role, and I encourage international partners to sustain their investment through continued support to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including the strengthening of its presence in the south of Lebanon, as spelled out by the strategic dialogue, as well as in the areas of civil-military cooperation and human rights.

70. I remain concerned about the continuing presence of unauthorized weapons in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, in breach of resolution 1701 (2006). The presence or firing of small arms in the area of operations, including during commemorative events, is not only in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) but also poses a risk to the population and UNIFIL personnel. I call upon the Government of Lebanon, which holds primary responsibility, to take all actions necessary to ensure that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations.

71. I welcome the legislation on the establishment of a national human rights institution that incorporates a national preventive mechanism against torture. It is an important step towards achieving increased accountability, transparency and compliance with human rights standards. Given the known link between human rights violations and the risk of radicalization, I encourage the Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese authorities to ensure that counter-terrorism and other security measures are consistent with the State's obligations, including under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

72. I condemn the participation of Lebanese citizens in the Syrian conflict in breach of the policy of disassociation that was agreed by all Lebanese political parties. The external military involvement of Hizbullah and other Lebanese elements exposes Lebanon to serious danger at a time when all efforts should focus on shielding it from the impact of regional crises. I therefore reiterate my call upon Hizbullah and all Lebanese parties to cease any involvement in the Syrian conflict. Adherence to the country's policy of disassociation pursuant to the Baabda Declaration remains the only viable course for Lebanon in the current regional environment.

73. I condemn the movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese-Syrian border in breach of resolution 1701 (2006) and shelling and shooting into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic. The lack of a delineated, demarcated Lebanese-Syrian border is no justification for violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I call upon all concerned to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

74. I am seriously concerned about the dangerous implications of the deteriorating situation in the Syrian Arab Republic for the future stability of Lebanon. The stability of Lebanon cannot be taken for granted. The uncertainty of the direction of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic puts Lebanon at risk of becoming collateral damage in this regional crisis and makes it all the more urgent to shield Lebanon from its impact.

75. The risk of radicalization among segments of the Lebanese and refugee populations, combined with the availability of arms outside the control of Lebanon, present risks to the country's stability. Illegally held firearms pose a threat to the security of the citizens of Lebanon and undermine the rule of law. I remind Member States of their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of unauthorized arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon.

76. I welcome the Government's decision to work in collaboration with the United Nations to develop a national plan of action for the prevention of violent extremism in Lebanon. Consistent with my Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, my Special Coordinator and the United Nations family in Lebanon will continue to engage in that initiative, which I encourage national and international stakeholders to support as an investment in conflict prevention.

77. Following the successful municipal elections last May, I am encouraged by the Government's initial readiness to take steps to ensure that the 2017 parliamentary elections are held on time, in accordance with the Constitution. After two consecutive deferments, the people of Lebanon deserve to exercise their democratic right to elect their representatives. I strongly encourage strengthened women's participation and effective representation with the highest turnout possible. The United Nations remains ready to provide any technical assistance as may be requested by the Lebanese Government.

78. The political and economic stability of Lebanon is a matter of regional and international interest that requires continued collective attention. I welcome the unity which the Security Council has consistently demonstrated to insulate Lebanon from regional crises. I welcome the continued country-level engagement of the International Support Group for Lebanon in Beirut and urge the Group to remain

mobilized in support of Lebanon. I further encourage regional partners, including Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, to use their influence constructively in order to help protect Lebanon from the spillover of regional conflicts.

79. Following my exchange of letters with Prime Minister Salam concerning the country's request for my good offices in assisting with the delineation of the exclusive economic zone between Lebanon and Israel, my Special Coordinator is in contact with all parties concerned. I encourage both Lebanon and Israel to look at the issue as an opportunity for establishing a mutually beneficial way to exploit offshore oil and gas resources and as an important confidence-building measure between the two countries.

80. I welcome the continued high level of donor support to Lebanon in response to the impact of the Syrian crisis, but stress that sustained support remains essential. Lebanon is at the front line of a conflict that will have long-term consequences for its economy, infrastructure and demography. Much more needs to be done, commensurate with the pledges made thus far. While host communities have been remarkable providers of assistance to refugees, the responsibility to address that crisis is collective. As world leaders came together at the General Assembly to discuss the urgent issue of refugees and migrants, I call upon all Member States, including from the region, to reinforce their assistance to help Lebanon cope with the impact of the crisis.

81. I remain highly concerned about the hardening of the discourse towards the refugee presence in Lebanon, including by some Government representatives regarding the return of Syrian refugees to their country. The position of the United Nations remains that Syrian refugees should return to the Syrian Arab Republic when conditions are conducive, or that they should be resettled in a third country. Host countries should not be expected to permanently settle refugees. When conditions allow, the United Nations will mobilize support for those returning to their home country. I urge the Government to publicly denounce xenophobic reactions that frame refugees as a threat.

82. I welcome the decision by the Government to review the regulatory framework governing access by Syrian refugees to the labour market. Concerted efforts are needed to facilitate the creation of employment opportunities for the Lebanese people and for Syrians. I urge the Government of Lebanon to waive, on a temporary basis, the residency fees for Syrians as outlined in its Statement of Intent. Progress in that matter will be crucial for the successful implementation of the London commitments.

83. I welcome the ongoing cooperation between the Lebanese authorities and Palestinian camp factions to ensure continued security in the camps. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive and just peace settlement, is ever more urgent. The structural deficit of the finances of UNRWA remains a serious concern. I reiterate my call to donors for greater support to UNRWA to enable the Agency to assist Palestine refugees in Lebanon effectively.

84. The international community owes Lebanon a debt of gratitude for the exceptional generosity with which the Lebanese people and Government are hosting an unprecedented number of refugees fleeing the war in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Both as a host country for refugees and as a model of pluralism, coexistence and democracy in a region torn by sectarian strife, Lebanon is widely recognized as a common good. But the country's model suffers from political weaknesses and vulnerability to outside shocks. The dangerous conflict dynamics in the Syrian Arab Republic make it imperative for the international community to actively help consolidate the security and stability of Lebanon. Likewise, resolution 1701 (2006) requires us, collectively, to seek to move forward with its implementation. Having achieved 10 years of relative calm along the Blue Line, Lebanon and Israel have a mutual interest and obligation to now take steps for moving past the fragile status quo of mutual deterrence. Both sides stand to gain more from fully implementing the resolution than from maintaining an active military frontier for another 10 years. Progress on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions will be central to ending conflict in the region and to a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

85. I wish to extend my continued appreciation to all countries contributing troops and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I welcome the recently arrived UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Michael Beary of Ireland, and wish him success, and commend the work of the military and civilian personnel of UNIFIL. I thank my Special Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag, and the staff of her office for their efforts.

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Letter dated 2 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 1 November 2016 addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

16-19338 (E) 101116

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Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 19 October 2016 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/71/556-S/2016/874), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding an "illegally issued notice to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the

effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2015 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan Airport stood at nearly 3,500,000 (compared with 3,250,000 in 2014), and a 7 per cent increase in that number is expected in 2016. Moreover, in 2015, nearly 26,000 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and around 210,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, a total which is expected to increase by 7 per cent in 2016. In that respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are progressing swiftly in a results-oriented atmosphere, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus